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Moral Mathematics: an interview with Campbell Brown
Campbell Brown (/philosophy/people/faculty/#campbell-brown) is
one of the most recent additions to our faculty. We thought we’d
welcome him to the Department with some questions.
 
Q: Hi Campbell, welcome to the Department. Can you tell us a
little bit about your academic background and about what
brought you to LSE Philosophy?
A: I’m a product of the Antipodean philosophy scene. I studied philosophy ퟋ�rst as an
undergraduate at the University of Auckland (in New Zealand, where I was born and
raised) and then did my PhD at the Australian National University. The ANU was a
wonderful place to be a PhD student. The philosophy department, being strongly
research-oriented, held frequent research events – conferences, workshops, seminars,
reading groups, etc. – and hosted loads of great visitors. Some of my new colleagues in
LSE Philosophy I ퟋ�rst met when they were visiting the ANU.
My ퟋ�rst academic job was at Bowling Green State University, in Bowling Green, Ohio. (In
case you’re wondering, no, there aren’t any bowling greens in Bowling Green, though it is
exceptionally 韓�at.) I then moved to Scotland, where I worked ퟋ�rst at the University of
Edinburgh and then the University of Glasgow. (Don’t ask me which city I prefer – might
not be safe to answer!)
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/campbell-
notebook.jpg)
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I joined the LSE in September of this year. What mainly attracted me to the department
was the style of philosophy done here. LSE has strengths both in moral/political
philosophy and in what is sometimes called rational choice (decision theory, social
choice theory, game theory). I try to keep a foot in both of these camps. (I have a long
stride, so it’s not as uncomfortable as it may sound.) LSE is therefore an ideal place for
someone like me.
 
Q: I understand that you’re interested in formal approaches to
moral and political philosophy. For the uninitiated, can you give us
an example of taking a formal approach to a particular issue in
moral or political philosophy?
A: While doing my PhD, I got interested in the issue of “consequentializing” moral
theories. Traditionally, consequentialism was considered one of the three or four major
moral theories, along with Kantian ethics, contractualism, and/or virtue ethics. These
were thought to be mutually exclusive rival options: you had to pick between them. But
some philosophers had challenged this traditional picture. They argued that these other
theories were not really competitors to consequentialism, but were in fact just di韌�erent
versions of consequentialism. Though not normally presented in this way, these theories
could be recast in consequentialist terms: they could be “consequentialized”.
Were this true, it would have quite radical implications for the way we think about moral
theories. But I wasn’t convinced that is was true. The arguments seemed inconclusive.
Typically, these involved canvassing a few non-consequentialist theories and indicating
how these might be conseqentialized. But this seemed insu្�cient to establish the
strong conclusion that all theories can be conseqentialized. This seemed like a “gap” in
the literature, an open question that could be answered more systematically and
rigorously with the aid of formal methods. Given a suitable formal representation of
moral theories, one could then deퟋ�ne consequentialism as a condition on this class of
theories, and then prove one way or the other whether they all satisퟋ�ed this condition.
So that’s what I set out to do. What I found was that not all theories can be
conseqentialized, or at least so I argue in a paper called “Consequentialize This
(http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/ퟋ�les/12473535/BROWN_C_Consequentialize_This.pdf)“.
That’s one example from my own work of using formal methods to address a question in
moral philosophy. I’m not sure how successful it was. But I like to think that the paper
did at least present a novel approach to tackling such questions – and it has a catchy
title!
 
6/9/2017 Moral Mathematics: an interview with Campbell Brown | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2016/11/01/moral­mathematics­an­interview­with­campbell­brown/ 3/4
Q: What are the beneퟋ�ts of this kind of formal approach over
traditional methods?
A: One great advantage of formal, or mathematical, methods is in the high degree of
clarity and precision they bring to questions of structure. What kinds of structure are
possible? What are their properties? How are they related to each other? Much of moral
and political philosophy – indeed much of philosophy – is centrally concerned with
structure. Simon Blackburn suggests a nice analogy: philosophy is “conceptual
engineering”. As engineers investigate physical structures (bridges and buildings),
philosophers investigate structures of ideas, or theories. Are these consistent and
coherent? Do they “hold weight”? The example I gave earlier is about structure.
Consequentialism can be thought of as a family of moral theories with a certain sort of
structure. (The paper that inspired my interest in the topic was Jamie Dreier’s “Structures
of Normative Theories
(https://www.brown.edu/academics/philosophy/sites/brown.edu.academics.philosophy/ퟋ�les/uploads/StructuresOfNormativeTheories_0.pdf)
When dealing with these structural questions, formal methods enable one to think and
communicate more clearly and precisely. Here’s another analogy that I like. We can
describe music in natural languages like English. We can characterise a piece of music as
“loud”, or “fast”, or “uplifting”, etc. But certain contexts, e.g., when composing or
performing music, demand a higher degree of precision than is possible in ordinary
English. Composers wouldn’t get far saying things like: “Play a loud happy bit for a while,
then go a bit quieter and more gloomy”. For this reason, musicians use a special
language, a set of concepts and formal notations, with which to express musical ideas
more clearly. It can be a bit baퟛ�ing for the unfamiliar, but once you’ve learned it, this
opens up many more possibilities for musical collaboration and creativity. The use of
formal methods in philosophy is very similar, I think. Philosophers who work without
such methods often seem to spend a lot of time struggling to understand each other.
The reason may be that they lack a language precise enough to articulate the complex
structures of ideas they are discussing.
 
Q: Finally, what do you think is the relevance of philosophy?
A: My take on the relevance of philosophy may already be suggested by what I’ve said
above. If philosophy is conceptual engineering, then its relevance to thought is like that
of real engineering to construction. Philosophy helps us build better views of the world –
 views that are coherent and uniퟋ�ed, rather than arbitrary, ad hoc, or downright
inconsistent.
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Campbell Brown (http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/people/faculty/#campbell-brown) is a
philosopher from New Zealand. He specialises in moral and political philosophy, especially
formal approaches to these. He has taught philosophy in ퟋ�ve countries. When not
philosophising, he likes to play guitar and video games. He draws cartoons, usually during
department meetings. And he has a dog called Caprica.
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